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Emerging Private Voluntary Programs and Climate 
Change: The Blind-Spots of the Agrifood Sector1 
 
Doris Fuchs and Frederike Boll 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Agriculture is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases” stated Greenpeace in its report 
“Cool Farming” from 2008. Considering the direct (soil and livestock) and indirect (fossil 
fuel use in farm operations and the production of agrochemicals) emissions from the agrifood 
sector, it represents between 17 and 32% of all global human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (Greenpeace 2008).i Add to this the amount of greenhouse gases produced by food 
processing, distribution, storage, preparation, and disposal and the overall impact of food 
production and consumption on climate change becomes visible. At the same time, 
agricultural production is highly vulnerable to climate change, as the latter has been linked to 
the likely loss of huge areas of productive land. Accordingly, it seems pertinent to investigate 
the interaction between the global agrifood system and climate change in more detail.  
                                                 
1
 For Karsten Ronit (ed.). Private Voluntary Programs in Global Climate Policy. Pitfalls and Potentials. 
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In order to understand this interaction and identify the most crucial aspects for the analyses, 
one has to pay attention to the changes that have taken place in the global agrifood system in 
the last decades. First, due to processes of capital concentration the agrifood sector is 
dominated by transnational corporate actors, which have established oligopolies in almost all 
segments of the system, today. Second, and in conjunction with this expansion in economic 
power, corporate actors have assumed political power to a previously unknown degree. One 
form, in which they exercise this political power, is the creation and implementation of 
private voluntary programs, i.e. institutions defining rules and standards for the global 
agrifood system. These private voluntary programs have dramatically expanded in number 
and reach. Third, private retail food programs and standards have assumed one of the most 
influential positions in this setting and become a dominant structural force in global agrifood 
governance in the last decade.  
 
Given that private retail food programs play such an important role in global agrifood 
governance today, they appear to be a particularly promising venue for investigating the 
interaction between the global agrifood system and climate change.ii After all, private retail 
food programs may offer a singularly effective point of intervention in reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with global food production and consumption. Retailers 
already have demonstrated their power to set standards for food production and processing 
with global reach. Due to the oligopolistic nature of the retail food market, these de jure 
voluntary standards easily assume a de facto mandatory nature. Moreover, the organizational 
structures for the implementation and monitoring of such rules and standards are already in 
place. In other words, food retail corporations today have the power and the instruments 
available to set, implement, monitor, and enforce private voluntary programs targeting the 
climate change impacts of the agrifood sector, if they want to do so. The following questions, 
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therefore, need to be asked: To what extent do the rules and standards set by private retail 
food programs address climate change issues? To what extent are they effective in addressing 
this issue? And what are the determinants of the extent and effectiveness of private voluntary 
programs in this respect?  
 
A first glance at the empirical evidence suggests that retail food corporations are active with 
respect to the issue of climate change, indeed. Walmart, for instance, launched the 
“Sustainability 360” campaign in 2005, in which it defined the target of receiving 100 percent 
of its energy from renewable sources as one of three core goals (Walmart 2009). Yet, the 
interaction between private voluntary programs and the climate change implications of the 
global agrifood system has not been sufficiently systematically investigated. To date, the link 
between climate change, private governance, and agrifood remains a black box in academic 
research and on the political agenda. 
 
This chapter aims to provide a first set of answers to the questions raised above. It analyzes a 
range of relevant private voluntary programs in the retail food sector, assesses the extent to 
which they address the issue of climate change and their likely transparency and 
effectiveness, and attempts to provide explanations for these developments. The chapter will 
show that some of the largest retailers are indeed active in this area, while many of the group 
programs, such as the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP), 
International Food Standard (IFS) or the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) are not. Using a 
broad range of criteria, the chapter evaluates and compares the different efforts 
systematically. Moreover, it critically reflects on activities and their range and promise of 
effectiveness.  
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In terms of explaining the coverage and stringency of private voluntary programs in the food 
retail sector and the issue of climate change, finally, the chapter will argue that the reasons for 
the lacking effectiveness and in other cases the complete neglect of climate change issues in 
general are twofold: First, the link between the agrifood sector and climate change is not 
immediately visible to the public/consumer and therefore there is a corresponding lack of 
pressure on the actors creating and implementing the respective private governance 
institutions to integrate climate change objectives. Second, addressing the most important 
sources of climate change in the agrifood sector would imply fundamental changes in its 
overall design and functioning rather than the regulation and optimization of certain specific 
processes. Existing private governance institutions, however, rarely (if ever) target such 
fundamental changes.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section delineates developments in the role of 
business actors in general and retail food corporations in particular with regard to the global 
agrifood system and global agrifood governance. Section 3 further develops the analytical 
framework presented in the book’s introduction and lays out a theoretical model for 
explaining the coverage and effectiveness of private voluntary programs, identifying the 
various incentive structures for firms to build and join programs. Section 4, then, assesses 
private voluntary programs by retail food corporations and relevant business groups and their 
goals and activities with respect to climate change and provides a first set of ideas for 
explaining their coverage and effectiveness. Section 4 concludes our chapter with a short 
summary and outlook. 
 
 
Private Actors in Agrifood Governance 
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Transnational actors have been playing a pivotal role in the global agrifood system for a while 
now. Globalization, with the associated trends of the liberalization of trade and capital flows, 
has fostered the development of business actors of an enormous size and reach in the agrifood 
system (Bonnano, Busch, Friedland, Gouveia, and Mingione 1994). The underlying processes 
of capital concentration, in turn, have meant the development of oligopolies in which just a 
handful (or less) of these actors control a large share of the market at almost every stage of the 
supply chain (see Table 1).  
 
While such oligopolies used to be more prominent in the production of input for the 
agricultural end of the food system as well as in the food processing stage, the process of 
capital concentration also became very visible at the retail end of the supply chain, in the last 
decade. Here, this process was facilitated and strengthened by new technological and 
logistical developments allowing a better control from farm to fork, as well as a competition 
based on quality aspects of products rather than just price (Busch and Lawrence 2005; 
Konefal, Mascarenhas, and Hatanaka 2005). Today, we can recognize ten large and 
internationally operating retail chains with aggressive expansion strategies, and experts 
predict further processes of capital concentration in this market (Dixon 2007). 
 
Global reach, capital concentration and the existence of oligopolies only tell one part of the 
story regarding the nature of today’s global agrifood system, however. Another important 
aspect is the dramatic expansion in private voluntary programs in this agrifood system in the 
last decades.iii Via a diversity of self-regulatory measures transnational corporations (TNCs) 
play an enormous role in the authoritative allocation of values, i.e. the politics, of the global 
agrifood system today. Private voluntary programs now exist in almost all spheres and sectors 
of the global agrifood system reaching from the production of agricultural inputs, food 
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products or biofuel to traceability schemes and food safety standards created and implemented 
by actors at the retail end of the supply chain. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
 
This development is all the more noteworthy, as it used to be corporate actors that were the 
prime focus of agrifood governance, whose conduct was deemed to be in need of monitoring 
and regulation. And not surprisingly so. After all, agricultural production and food provision 
are highly sensitive policy fields, at the core of any government’s task to ensure the well-
being of its population. 
 
Today, however, these TNCs have become important subjects rather than just objects of 
global agrifood governance (Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Graz and Noelke 2007). Similar 
developments have been documented for other policy fields. The literature identifies a range 
of reasons for this trend. Optimistic observers argue that private actors have had to fill an 
existing void in public governance in order to be able to function in this global market 
(Biedermann 2007). Critical observers, however, point to attempts to increase market shares 
and rents, the wish to pre-empt public regulation, and a supportive neoliberal Zeitgeist as 
motors behind this development (Drache 2001; Gibson 1999). If we apply these perspectives 
to the agrifood sector, we arrive at very different expectations regarding the impact of private 
governance on the sustainability of the global agrifood system, of course, as well as 
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assessments of the democratic legitimacy of private agrifood governance (Porter and Ronit 
2010). 
 
Within private voluntary programs in the agrifood sector, retail programs play a special role, 
as they are able to shape incentive structures along the supply chain. Retail corporations have 
dramatically increased their structural power in the past decade due to the combination of the 
process of capital concentration, pointed out above, and their advantageous position in the 
market, i.e. their proximity to the consumer (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Arentsen 2009). Just 
within the period of a few years, private standards and certification systems have become 
powerful gatekeepers for access to the global market and economic opportunities within it. 
While private governance is de jure voluntary, private retail standards are one of the clearest 
examples that de facto it may often not be voluntary at all. Private retail food standards and 
certification systems define criteria for food production and processing, with an emphasis on 
quality and food safety issue and some attention also being paid to environmental and social 
aspects. Suppliers need to be able to implement the rules and standards and document their 
compliance if they want to be able to sell their products in the global market, i.e. be part of the 
supply chain of one of the major retail corporations.iv  
 
As a consequence of the enormous power, which private retail food standards exercise in 
today’s global agrifood system, this investigation into the implications of private voluntary 
programs in the food sector for climate change concentrates on them. It examines whether, to 
what extent, and how these standards address the issue of climate change. Moreover, it 
attempts to provide a first set of explanations for such a focus (or lack of it) as well as 
assessment of the impact one can expect. 
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The Coverage and Effectiveness of Private Voluntary Programs  
 
In this section, we present a theoretical framework to analyze the behavior of firms and 
industries to identify determinants of the evolution of private voluntary programs and 
examine the questions rasied above. This framework includes an input and an output 
dimension. Input refers to whether programs address certain issues and include certain 
members, as well as includes questions such as the substantive stringency of a standard. 
Output refers to the effectiveness of programs and whether actual changes in business conduct 
are achieved in the course of the implementation of the agreed private voluntary program. 
This actual behavior is a function of the agreed standards, i.e. of the rules and membership 
structure, of course, but also of existing incentives and opportunities to comply with the 
standards, to outperform them, or to fail to comply.  
 
In following this structure, we further develop and apply the four basic elements of private 
voluntary programs delineated in the introduction to this volume: designing, joining, 
monitoring, and complying. Thus, we treat aspects of designing and joining in the question of 
the determinants of input. It is slightly difficult to strictly differentiate between these elements 
due to the specific nature of our field of inquiry, in which designing has plaid a much more 
important role than joining, and these aspects have so far been more developed than 
monitoring and complying. Because of the explorative character of the research and its focus 
on relatively recent developments, it is of primary interest, how and why companies create 
and install different standards, in the first place. Individual initiatives dominate the field at 
this point, and those group standards that do exist have been developed jointly by the large 
retailers. This, in turn, implies that smaller actors along the supply chain have limited choices 
when it comes to the question of joining. Accordingly, the question of joining is not that 
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relevant in our analysis. In terms of issue coverage, in particular, the important choices are 
being made in the designing stage. 
 
We treat aspects of monitoring and complying in the section on output. The question of the 
extent to which actual conduct is being monitored, by whom, and with what consequences, 
i.e. whether there are sanctions or public reporting on compliance failures, strongly influences 
the likelihood of the latter, and thereby the achievements of private voluntary programs. Of 
course, there is also an influence of monitoring and sanctioning provisions on the willingness 
of an actor to join a private voluntary program. Likewise, there is an interaction between what 
the actors creating a program are willing to subscribe to and the performance of programs.  
Admittedly, these interactions need to be further developed in our analysis in the future. 
 
 
Intput – Designing and Joining 
 
Output of private voluntary programs, i.e. the determined standard, can be illustrated as 
consequence of cost-benefit analyses of participating business actors. Institutional as well as 
material goods are usually characterized by a bulk of property rights which show different 
characteristics regarding their divisibility and usability (Fuchs 2003). Governance institutions, 
which at first sight serve the provision of public goods, have private benefits as well. If a 
company can reduce the risk of a scandal resulting from ecological and economic harm by, 
for example, introducing a system fostering food safety or reducing the climate impact, then 
this system will generate not only better food safety or less environmental pollution as a good 
for society but also a private benefit for the company. Likewise, the basic improvement of a 
company’s image as a provider of high quality products and a good steward to the 
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environment, the opportunity to gain higher prices, or the prevention of expensive 
governmental regulation add to this private benefit of private rule-setting.  
 
For business purposes, it is reasonable to invest in and join private voluntary programs as 
long as the private benefits of the relevant program exceed its private costs. This issue is also 
dealt with in the context of club theory, which is developed and applied in the chapter by 
Hsueh and Prakash. Graph 1 shows this cost-benefit function for two companies A and B. The 
cost of investment in the program (Ca and Cb) increases with the stringency of a standard to an 
increasing degree. “Stringency” here means substantive performance. One can differentiate 
between designed climate standards according to whether they define (only) process standards 
or performance standards as well, for instance, and in terms of the ambition of the 
performance criteria. While first improvements in generally can be attained with relatively 
low investments, marginal costs of improvement increase with rising standard stringency. The 
position of the cost function depends on technological and organizational characteristics of 
the company and can vary, for example due to the existence of economies of scale or 
differences in the know how of companies. Also the private benefit of investments in private 
voluntary programs, for example in the form of a reduction in the risk of scandals, increases 
with such investments (BA and BB), to a decreasing degree however. While first investments 
can be expected to already deliver substantial improvements regarding the risk potential, 
further reductions in risk decrease with more investments.   
 
graph 1 about here 
 
 
The different cost- and benefit functions of companies follow from the fact that not all of 
them have the same opportunity of transforming governance investments into corresponding 
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economic gains, as we shall see later. Companies which are more vulnerable to civil society 
campaigns or new public regulation due to their company and brand image, sector 
characteristics, cultural origin, or proximity to consumers, or which are more sensitively hit 
by political consumption strategies, can, in principle, benefit more from private voluntary 
programs than companies for which the different factors do not apply. The resources of civil 
society organizations for monitoring business conduct are limited. Also, the boundaries of 
public receptiveness and reactivity regarding the revelation of “scandals” show that only the 
companies which so to speak stand in the first row of public perception feel public pressure in 
its whole extent. Especially the corporations, which are of pivotal interest in the present 
research inquiry, are in close contact to consumers and are therefore very vulnerable to 
consumer attitudes towards the company.v  
 
As emphasized in the introduction and in the other chapters of this book general and sector-
specific knowledge and values play a role. Indeed, the presence or lack of legal and 
accounting expertise may exercise an influence on a company’s assessment of the costs and 
benefits of investments in a private voluntary program. Similarly, the benefit function’s 
position will be influenced by deliberate and unconscious decisions regarding the valuation of 
risks and opportunities as well. In this respect, the top management’s normative perspective 
and therefore connected social and intra-corporate learning processes also have an effect 
(Nash/Ehrenfeld 1997; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999).  
 
Next to company characteristics, the problem characteristics of climate change will have an 
influence on cost-benefit functions. Thus, the extent of a problem, filtered through available 
information and perceptions, as well as the likely impact of the private voluntary program on 
this problem will affect a company’s willingness to invest in the program. Likewise, public 
awareness of the existence of a problem and its relationship to the company’s activities, 
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which influences the likelihood of public or consumer pressure, is going to have an effect. 
Indeed, companies may gain more from investing in private voluntary programs targeting 
marginal issues or issues in a superficial way, if these issues or superficial measures have or 
can easily gain the attention of the public. Similarly, the management’s norms and beliefs 
regarding the particular problem can play a role. 
 
Finally, the formal involvement of civil society or public actors influences the utility 
functions of participating businesses as well. The involvement of civil society may lead to 
higher levels of governance investments, when designing, implementing and enforcing rules, 
for instance. This effect can be explained easily from the benefit point of view since civil 
society’s participation usually implicates higher credibility and, therefore, higher private 
benefits. The same applies to participating public actors, admittedly to a somewhat lesser 
extent due to the - at least in some countries - growing concern about a potential capture of 
the state.vi 
 
On the cost side, technological and structural factors are likely to play a role in climate 
change policy. Thus, the cost function is likely to be placed lower for issues that can be 
solved with available and affordable technological changes or small organizational efforts, 
which are really critical issues in the field of climate change policy. For technologies that 
need to be developed first (in which case there is also a risk of development failure) or for 
fundamental changes affecting the core of a company’s activities and existence, cost functions 
may be deterrently high. Similarly, companies’ as well industry profiles differ with respect to 
their exposure to certain problems, of course. Thus, a company in an extremely energy 
intensive sector may face higher costs with respect to energy savings measures than a 
company in a sector with low energy intensity. 
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In sum, the following major factors can be expected to exercise an influence on an actor’s 
utility function regarding investments in private voluntary programs: 1. Factors influencing its 
visibility and perceived pressure: the size of the company, country of origin, host country, 
brand/business and sector history and image, range of products, problem characteristics; 2. 
factors influencing an actor’s normative position: values of the executive board, affiliation in 
business associations, problem characteristics; 3. additional factors influencing the 
opportunity for private profit: competitiveness of the environment, provision of legitimacy 
due to civil society and/or state involvement; 4. factors influencing the cost function 
specifically: extent and nature of necessary changes, availability and affordability of 
technological and organizational solutions, product and process characteristics with respect to 
problem in question 
 
The perspective on cost-benefit functions of business actors demonstrates that a company will 
prefer a more stringent rule-setting, the higher the privatizable benefit of the rules and the 
lower the cost of required investments. In the above graph, company A has relatively higher 
opportunities to privatize the benefits of governance institutions and a relatively lower cost 
function than company B. Accordingly, investments in such a governance institution can be 
profitable for company A up to point sA, while investments for company B are only lucrative 
up to point sB. However from an economic point of view, the ideal point of investment would 
be attained earlier in each case, namely at the point of maximum net benefit which is shown 
in graph 2 for company A with sA* (and, of course, can be equally determined for company 
B).vii  
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Graph 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
The different cost-benefit functions point out that under private voluntary programs exceeding 
the participation of a single company a compromise frequently will be needed. In other words, 
for group standards (e.g. sectoral standards) rather than individual private voluntary programs, 
the process of negotiation among the different actors needs to be considered as well. The 
impetus for the development of such a group standard may be the experience with public or 
civil society pressures, the existence of similar normative predispositions of the management, 
or a need to solve common problems (besides pressure by other actors). Likewise, such a 
process may be initiated by an external agenda-setter, such as a business association, civil 
society organizations or effective and recognized bodies outside the industry in general, as 
discussed in the introduction. In addition, a company itself may actively recruit others to 
create a joint program. A precondition for the successful development of a group standard, 
however, would seem to be a minimum of common interests among the powerful actors in the 
group. In consequence, we can add a fourth point to the list of determinants of the output of 
private voluntary programs that we identified above, namely factors influencing the 
development of group standards: minimum of common interests and the distribution of power 
among actors in the group. We will later see how this factor affects group programs in the 
agrifood sector.  
 
For our example, the stringency of the agreed standard, respectively the output of the private 
voluntary program between company A and B, would lie somewhere between SA* and SB*, 
including both end points (SB* ≤ SAB ≤ SA*). In other words, there are three possibilities: an 
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agreement on the minimum standard (SB* = SAB), a compromise on a standard between both 
ideal points (SB* < SAB < SA*), or an agreement on the maximum standard (SA*= SAB).  
 
Simultaneously, these thoughts show possible strategies of external actors to influence the 
input into private voluntary programs. Thus, civil society organizations or a “shadow of 
hierarchy” created by public actors can increase the cost of failure for business actors, and, 
therefore, move the companies’ benefit functions to the upper right. In this context, a focus by 
civil society organizations or public actors on companies of type B suggests itself, since a 
movement of their benefit functions most clearly could improve the agreed standard.viii 
 
 
Output – Monitoring and Complying 
 
The three above mentioned possibilities of input contain different implications for the 
implementation of the standard and, therefore, the output, respectively the effectiveness of 
private voluntary programs. In case of an agreement on minimum standard (SB*), the 
incentive arises for company A to invest beyond the standard. Such investments by A will be 
smaller, however, as a softer standard cannot be communicated with as much gain. When 
there is a compromise between the positions, incentives of non-compliance arise for company 
B, besides the incentives for A to exceed the standard. For the third model, the agreement on 
maximum standard, the incentive for company B not to comply with the standards is the 
largest. In this respect, the effectiveness of a rule should be thought of as a band of 
performance around the agreed standard SAB, which allows for both leaders and laggards 
(graph 3).  
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The direction of this band will depend on a number of factors. If the actors agree on a 
minimum standard (SB* = SAB), the band will be to the right of the agreed point of investment 
(graph 3a). When there is a compromise between both preferred positions (SB* < SAB < SA*), it 
will be both above and underneath the agreed standard (graph 3b), and when a high standard 
is agreed on, the band will be on the left of the point of investment (graph 3c). The spread of 
the band below the standard will be influenced by the existence of monitoring, sanctioning, 
and reporting mechanisms, among others. These will influence the negotiations on the 
stringency of the standard already, as company B will refuse to accept a high standard that is 
coupled with strong opportunities for monitoring and sanctioning. Thus, the actual 
effectiveness of private voluntary programs can clearly exceed the agreed standard or clearly 
lie underneath.  
 
 
 
Graph 3 about here 
 
 
When can one expect which form and direction of a performance band? Generally, tight 
performance bands are only probable within small groups of relatively homogeneous actors, 
and the agrifood sector is a highly oligopolistic one. However, as soon as we talk about more 
encompassing rules including a large group of firms, a relatively extended stretch should be 
expected.  
 
Also the factors influencing the direction of the band of performance can be identified. The 
agreed climate standard will depend on the power distribution among companies, control and 
penalty possibilities, as well as on costs associated with defection of individual companies. 
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Thereby, it is assumed that the case of standard agreement is rare at the upper end of the 
performance spectrum. A highly ambitious standard which enables laggards’ defection only 
makes sense for leaders if neither the standard’s reputation is damaged nor their own. Such 
damage could result, after all, in case failure of standard performance by laggards becomes 
public. A highly ambitious standard without the opportunity of defection, i.e. with efficient 
control and sanctioning mechanisms, however, will hardly be acceptable for mass-market 
companies, and, inasmuch, only be existent in case of a strong asymmetric power distribution 
in favor of companies with higher benefit functions.  
 
Moreover, one can expect that a group standard will be located the closer to the left end of the 
performance band, the less relative influence companies with high benefit functions have in 
negotiations, and the more monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are created. The latter 
will be needed more if the group is heterogeneous and big, i.e. the bigger the collective action 
problems within the group and the incentive to defect. In such situations, one is more likely to 
encounter rather low standards, respectively standards which secure the minimum 
performance and, simultaneously, give leeway to the better performance of businesses, and 
foster the expansion of the performance band towards the right through incentive structures 
and learning processes. Hence, one can derive a minimum of program effectiveness from the 
standard’s stringency in such situations and, simultaneously, consider a further potential 
positive momentum from learning processes and incentives to out-perform the standard. One 
should not infer standard effectiveness only from the good performance of individual leader 
companies, however. In other words, the usefulness of individual case studies or even surveys 
of a select range of companies (such as the biggest ones) or companies in the “first row” is 
limited here. 
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Common rules and standards within the midfield of the performance band should be expected 
as a compromise solution which allows a certain range of actual conduct in both directions. 
However, leaders should have an interest in standards not being undercut too often and 
explicitly, and, thereby, losing their private benefit. Such standards can be found in situations 
in which informal control and penalty mechanisms exist due to group characteristics, and 
collective action problems remain manageable. The standard’s stringency itself provides an 
indication of its average program effectiveness in such cases. However, due to their frequent 
focus on leaders or laggards, the value of case studies regarding individual companies or a 
select number of companies is limited here as well. Again, empirical studies thus would need 
to analyze the full range of relevant companies or an arbitrary sample.  
 
In sum, the following factors can be expected to determine the extent to which a program 
actually changes business’ conduct and pattern of complying, i.e. the output of a private 
voluntary program: 1. Factors influencing the collective action problems: size and 
heterogeneity of target group. 2. Power asymmetries among the actors involved, and 3. 
Factors influencing the likelihood of defection: monitoring and sanctioning opportunities, 
public reporting of compliance failures 
 
The above theoretical discussion has identified a range of factors influencing the willingness 
of companies to design, join, and comply with private voluntary programs. In the following, 
we will attempt to explain the extent to which private retail food programs address the issue 
of climate change and their likely program effectiveness on the basis of these factors. Such an 
explanation has crucial implications for the handling climate change as well as private 
voluntary programs. Specifically, it will provide a basis for assessing whether private 
voluntary programs can provide alternative or relevant supplements to traditional public 
regulation. We have identified factors in the incentive structures of firms that may both 
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facilitate and impede collective action, and hence pave the way for individual action through 
retailers in the agrifood sector. In the following analysis, we will examine how this theoretical 
framework can be applied, attending to designing, joining, monitoring and complying. 
Because programs are currently under development, emphasis is primarily on the input side of 
programs, and especially on the problem of designing. At the same time, however, we also 
address problems of recruiting new members, monitoring corporate behavior, and seeking 
compliance with rules. In the conclusion, we will finally summarize our findings on the 
potential role of private voluntary programs in dealing with climate change and the impact of 
the factors outlined in the theoretical framework on these programs  
 
 
Retailers’ Climate Change Governance in the Agrifood Sector  
 
This section provides an overview, assessment and first set of explanations of private retail 
food programs that address climate change issues and their specifications. It first lays out the 
activities of the ten largest food retail corporations before describing the efforts by retailer 
groups and associations. In our approach, we use four categories based on the theoretical 
framework outlined above to measure the stringency (input) and the effectiveness (output) of 
private retail programs in tackling climate change: designing targets (A), partners and 
standards (B), transparency and reporting (C), and governance mechanisms for monitoring 
(D). The first two categories emphasize the input side of the process, while the latter relate 
more strongly to output.  
 
We focus on the ten leading food retailers in the world (Walmart, Carrefour, Tesco, the Metro 
Group, Kroger, Auchan, Rewe, Aldiix, Lidlx and Cosco) and the most relevant groups (British 
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Retail Consortium (BRC), the European Retail Round Table (ERRT), the Global Food Safety 
Initiative (GFSI), Global Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP) and the International Food 
Standard (IFS)), because of their importance in current developments in the global agrifood 
system and global agrifood governance. These corporations and associations are the dominant 
actors in the food sector, responsible for the processes and fundamental changes which were 
described in Section 2. Thereby, we are able to avoid selecting our cases on the basis of the 
dependent variable and able to ensure a comprehensive picture of the relevant actors. In other 
words, we are also able to point out which of these retailers and groups neglect the issue of 
climate change.  
 
Importantly, the role of food in the product portfolio varies for the retailers and groups 
analyzed. For Walmart, Carrefour, Kroger, and the Metro Group other products such as toys, 
electronics, clothing, or jewelry are at least as much a core focus of their business activities as 
food. Likewise the BRC and ERRT, as two of the groups, whose private voluntary programs 
we consider, do not focus on food retail specifically, in contrast for instance to the GFSI, 
GlobalGAP and the IFS as alternatives. We will reconsider this difference in portfolio, when 
reflecting on the activities by the various retailers and groups with respect to climate change. 
 
Designing Targets (A) 
 
This first category is closely associated with the inquiry into issues of designing in private 
voluntary programs, pursued by this volume. As decisions about design tend to have 
consequences for joining, our analysis also indirectly relates to that issue, of course. 
“Designing Targets” examines the objectives and levels of stringency determined in the 
explicit design of private voluntary programs. It asks whether the programs address the 
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relevant questions, in our case climate change. It also explores to what extent specific targets 
have been set, for instance in terms of emissions reductions. In addition, the design of private 
voluntary programs can be assessed in terms of investments in related issues, such a 
renewable energy. Finally, the range of processes and actors addressed by private voluntary 
programs has important implications for the potential impact of these programs. Accordingly, 
this section asks to what extent the identified programs target the retailers’ supply chains. 
 
When looking at these four issues, we find a wide variety in program design. Walmart and 
Tesco explicitly address all four aspects in their programs. Walmart, for example, initiated a 
long-term program, in which it specifies its aim “to reach a day where all of our energy comes 
from a renewable source” (Walmart 2009: 6). The corporation created the “Sustainability 
360” approach, in which it attempts to integrate its associates, suppliers, communities and 
customers in its climate policy (Walmart 2008a). Walmart’s “sustainability goals” are: to 
source 100 % of energy from renewable sources, create zero waste, and sell products that 
sustain the world’s resources and environment. To achieve these goals, the company has set 
several benchmarks to improve the energy efficiency of its stores and trucking fleet. While 
sounding quite ambitious, one also has to realize a major weakness of Walmart’s efforts, 
however.  The program fails to set a date, by which the goal “Sustainability 360” should be 
realized.  
 
Tesco initiated a climate change program with three main parts: the company tries to reduce 
its own direct footprint; it works with its supply chains and partners to reduce emissions more 
broadly; and it wants to lead a revolution in green consumption (Tesco 2009). Specifically, 
Tesco started to set targets, which address the reduction of greenhouse emissions in its 
buildings and its goods. Here, it wants to halve emissions from existing buildings by 2020, to 
halve distribution emissions of each case of goods delivered by 2012, and to halve emissions 
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from new stores by 2020 (all against a baseline of 2006). To achieve its goals, the company 
invested £100 million in a Sustainability Technology Fund to support large-scale world-wide 
carbon reduction technologies in its stores, distribution centers and supply chains, in 2007.  
 
Carrefour or Rewe perform relatively well in terms of the designing of targets as well, each 
addressing three of the four aspects. As part of the relevant measures, Rewe, for instance, has 
announced an aim to cut its greenhouse gas emission by 30% by 2015. Moreover, Rewe 
claims that it is covering nearly 100% of its energy demand in Germany with renewable 
energies (Rewe 2009). Carrefour made a commitment to reduce its energy consumption by 20 
percent per square meter of sales area by 2020, in 2004. To achieve its target, the Carrefour 
Group initiated an Energy Management System (EMS) project - a theme also referred to by 
Clapp and Thistlethwaite in their chapter - to enable it to develop telemetry and remote 
control of equipment (The Carrefour Group 2009). 
 
The programs of Kroger and the Metro Group take a middle position. They are concerned 
with climate policy issues, but the various programs are not as detailed as those of the four 
first-mentioned TNCs. The US American food retailer Kroger made a commitment for change 
in three areas,xi in which it plans to reduce its environmental footprint: energy conservation, 
emissions reduction and waste reduction (Kroger 2009). Ambitiously, Kroger specifies a goal 
of reducing the overall energy consumption in stores by 30 percent by 2010, using 2000 as a 
base. Kroger states that “it has worked aggressively in all areas of [its] business to reduce 
energy consumption” (Kroger 2009: 8). It claims to already have reduced its overall energy 
consumption by more than 22% - or 1.6 billion kilowatt hours or 1 million metric tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions – since 2000 (Kroger 2009). However, Kroger fails to 
comprehensively address suppliers or the question of renewable energy sources. The Metro 
Group has been mentioning specific objectives in its reports, since 2007. It has committed to 
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decreasing its emissions in the period from 2006 to 2015 by 15% per square meter of sales 
area. To achieve its objectives, the Metro Group publicly promotes its goals to change its own 
as well as other actors’ behavior (Metro Group 2008).  
 
Efforts by Auchan and Aldi South show even less specificity, thereby raising questions 
regarding the seriousness of the companies’ efforts. Auchan does not formulate precise goals, 
but commits itself to reducing its energy consumption, carbon emissions, and emissions from 
transport. In addition, it has announced plans to invest in new technologies, innovations and 
renewable energy to reduce its impact on the climate (Auchan 2009). Aldi South has 
committed itself to three types of climate activities: saving energy in CO2 intensive 
production mechanisms (fossil fuels), winning energy from renewable sources, and protecting 
the climate (Aldi South 2009a;b;c). However, there is no commitment to explicitly defined 
goals. Moreover, it is quite noteworthy that Aldi South only addresses these issues on its 
German webpage. 
 
Finally, Lidl, Aldi North, and Cosco rarely mention the issue of climate change. If we look at 
the design of the environmental program of the three companies, we see that these TNCs have 
no commitments to CO2 reductions or related environmental issues.  
 
The specificity, stringency and comprehensiveness of the targets designed into the private 
voluntary programs by retail food corporations vary widely, then. This is all the more 
noteworthy, as even the best programs still tend to have considerable weaknesses. The failure 
to set target dates, for instance, means that it will be difficult for stakeholders to hold the 
company to any promises. More importantly, most of the targets specified for emissions 
reductions, for instance, focus on the easy aspects of food retailing, such a store lighting, 
cooling, or the efficiency of the truck fleet. The more difficult aspects of the climate change 
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impact of the agrifood system, such as the overall distances of travel of products sourced and 
distributed in a global system, or rise in the average carbon footprint of food products 
resulting from the ongoing industrialization of production methods or an increasing share of 
meat products in diets, for instance, are rarely being addressed. 
  
 
Partners and Standards (B) 
 
The second category inquires into public or civil society partners involved in the design and 
implementation of food retailer’s private voluntary programs as well as international or 
national standards facilitating the accessibility and comparability of the programs.xii. Both 
aspects are primarily a question of program design (and thereby joining), but also relate to 
output issues in the form of complying, as these external actors and standards potentially 
increase the likelihood of compliance. In terms of design, inclusion of partners and standards 
able to allow for benchmarking suggests a greater probability of stringency of programs. 
 
Public-private partnerships and private-private partnerships (e.g. with NGOs) are part of 
Carrefour´s, Tesco´s and Walmart´s policy. In 2002 and 2004, Carrefour conducted a carbon 
assessment of its stores in partnership with the ADEME (French Environment and Energy 
Management Agency). In addition, it joined the Supply Chain Leadership Collaboration in 
2008 “to raise awareness […] of the effect of CO2 emissions and general climate change” 
(The Carrefour Group 2009). The public institution supports the company to calculate the 
ecological footprint of the products provided by the retailer. Like Carrefour, Tesco has 
different partners on different sectoral levels. To decrease the carbon footprint in the 
distribution sector for example, it works with the Institute of Grocery Distribution, a UK 
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charity, which informs and educates people who work in grocery stores, on how to implement 
best practices for reducing CO2 emissions (Tesco 2009). Simultaneously, Tesco works 
together with the University of Manchester and Defra (Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs) to gain support to reduce the environmental impact of the company. 
Walmart and the Clinton Climate Initiative, in turn, announced a partnership on the US 
Mayors’ Climate Protection Summit in 2007 (Walmart n.n). This partnership plans to support 
the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies, such as energy efficient building 
materials and systems, and to explore ways to use their purchasing resources to reduce prices 
on sustainable technologies (Walmart 2009a). In addition to this initiative, Walmart created a 
Food and Agriculture Network, a coalition of buyers, suppliers, civil society organizations 
and academics, to decrease the environmental impact of food miles, water use and 
degradation, packaging and improve energy efficiency (Walmart 2009a).  
 
Some of the other retailers also work with public or civil society partners, but do so to a lesser 
extent or work with weaker partners. The Metro Group and Rewe specify that they cooperate 
with the German Oeko-Institut e.V. (Institute for Applied Ecology), an environmental think 
tank, in their efforts. In addition, the energy provider Energie-Handels-Gesellschaft supports 
Rewe in sourcing its electricity from renewable sources, according to Rewe (Rewe 2009). As 
this partner seems to exist only for this purpose, however, its dependency on Rewe means that 
the partnership cannot necessarily be expected to increase program stringency. Auchan is also 
a partner of ADEME. Moreover, it states that its commitments to climate issues are based on 
the ideas of the Grenelle de l'environnement, a debate held in France in 2007 between the 
government, professional associations, private actors, and civil society (Auchan 2009). 
 
Lidl, Kroger, Aldi North and Aldi South do not provide any information about partnerships.  
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If we address the question of standards, we find a substantial difference among the different 
private voluntary programs among the food retailers. While some retailers mention a range of 
standards or benchmarks, others do not address any of them. Tesco, Carrefour, Cosco, and 
Rewe, for instance, use the Greenhouse Gas Protocolxiii to measure their CO2 emissions. As a 
supporting instrument, Tesco, Carrefour, the Metro Group and Rewe use the ISO Standards 
14040 and 14044, also discussed in the chapter by Clapp and Thistlethwaite, to calculate their 
emissions. In addition, Tesco and Walmart have been cooperating with the Carbon Disclosure 
Project since 2007 and publish their carbon footprints through it. Since 2002, Carrefour and 
Walmart publish their sustainability reports in line with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
moreover (Walmart 2009; The Carrefour Group 2005). In contrast, Kroger, Lidl, and Aldi 
South do not employ any standards that would allow a comparative assessment of their 
programs.  
 
To sum up, we can see that partner and standards serve to differentiate between the design of 
the corporations’ voluntary programs with respect to climate change. Particularly noticeable is 
that the biggest retailers (Walmart, Carrefour, and Tesco) appear to be quite ambitious in 
joining standards and maintaining partnerships. Clearly, the internal weakness of many of the 
standards employed means that they cannot ensure the stringency or effectiveness of private 
voluntary programs by food retailers. Moreover, the partnerships vary in their extent and 
power relationship between the partners. Still, such partnerships and standards allow the 
characterization and assessment of the various programs on an additional dimension. 
 
Transparency and Reporting (C) 
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The third category discusses various aspects of providing information and transparency to 
external stakeholders. It is thus related to designing and joining, but also directly to 
complying, as the potential for external assessment is likely to increase pressure for 
compliance. Thereby, this category also moves the aspect of program effectiveness (output) 
more into the center of attention. To assess transparency and reporting, we look at how much 
information the companies provide and how transparent the access to this information is. In 
addition, we explore whether the company publishes a (sustainability) report. Both aspects 
only provide a basic indication of program performance, of course, as information provided 
by sustainability reports, is notorious for its vagueness and promotional character. 
Nevertheless, such information needs to exist if external stakeholders are supposed to have 
any chance of gaining an impression of a program. Finally, we investigate whether the 
programs attempt to capture the environmental impact of products through a carbon label or 
similar instruments. Importantly, such instruments, specifically carbon labels, do not only 
provide information to consumers as external stakeholders. They also ensure specificity in the 
provision of information and allow for a demand for change, which renders them an important 
element in the stringency and ambition designed into a program. While treating carbon labels 
in the category of transparency and reporting (C), then, a clear link to the designing of targets 
(A) category should be noted.  
 
With respect to transparency and reporting, we find that Tesco, Walmart and Carrefour 
provide a relatively broad range of information on their climate programs in the form of 
sustainability reports and other documents on their websites. Tesco and Carrefour have been 
publishing sustainability reports since 2002. Walmart started only in 2007, but it has been 
publishing an additional “Sustainability Progress Report,” in which it presents an overview of 
the status of achievements regarding the company´s environmental objectives, since 2008 
(Walmart 2009). Rewe and Auchan only recently started publishing sustainability reports 
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(2009), while those of the Metro Group and Kroger have been existing longer, but contain 
relatively less information. In addition, Rewe and the Metro Group provide a climate 
brochure. In comparison to these retail food corporations, Lidl, Aldi South, Aldi North and 
Cosco provide only limited information on their activities with respect to climate change. 
Neither Aldi South, nor Aldi North, Lidl, and Cosco publish sustainability reports. The 
German food retailers Aldi South and Lidl provide some information on their German 
websites. No information is available on other country websites. Cosco provides relevant 
information only in its annual financial report.  
 
If we look at the question of labeling, we see that Tesco, Carrefour, Rewe and Auchan are the 
only TNCs to discuss the labeling of products in the design of their programs. Tesco was the 
first food retailer to introduce carbon labeled products.xiv By the end of February 2009, Tesco 
had labeled 100 products of its assortment. Importantly, these products do not include meat 
products. Auchan, too, introduced product carbon labeling to increase the environmental 
awareness of its customers. In 2008, Rewe started a pilot project to create and implement a 
carbon label for selected products. In the coming years, Rewe plans to increase the number of 
labeled products (Rewe 2009). In comparison to the corporations above, Carrefour argues that 
“by focusing only on greenhouse gas emissions, it obscures other environmental criteria, such 
as water, biodiversity and toxicity, which may be of paramount importance in the case of 
certain products” (The Carrefour Group 2008: 11). Rather pursuing the carbon label approach, 
therefore, Carrefour follows a Life-Cycle Assessment to measure the environmental impacts 
of a product at “each stage of its life-cycle, from raw-material production to waste disposal.” 
(The Carrefour Group 2008: 12).  
 
Information and labeling are important to characterize not only the design – the input 
dimension – but, importantly, also the effectiveness – the output dimension of private 
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voluntary programs. Similarly to our results for partnerships and standards (B), we find that 
only a few retailers seriously engage in the provision of information to external stakeholders 
(C). Again, the biggest retailers are the ones who appear to be more ambitious in publishing 
and pursuing product labeling. Even those programs, however, still lack specificity and 
comprehensiveness in their climate change related reporting. 
 
 
Monitoring (D) 
 
Our last category addresses the issue of monitoring, i.e. inquires into the internal governance 
mechanisms of the selected private voluntary programs. Again, internal monitoring 
mechanisms are a question of design (and joining), and thus relate to the input dimension. 
More importantly, however, they relate to the output function as monitoring is a precondition 
for even the most basic potential for internal pressures to ensure compliance. In other words, 
to answer the question whether the programs are likely to be effective, it is also necessary to 
analyze if the design of the implemented standards and programs will be monitored and 
evaluated regularly. Therefore, we investigate whether information on evaluation, monitoring 
or control will be provided by the companies.  
 
Walmart reports that it has initiated the so-called Walmart Sustainable Value Network to 
monitor the implementation of its objectives (Walmart 2008b). It is a cooperation between 
Walmart employees, civil society organizations, academics, politicians and suppliers, and has 
the mandate to monitor the targets in all business activities and report the performance to 
Walmart (Walmart 2008b). Carrefour and Tesco, in turn, have implemented “Key 
Performance Indicators” to evaluate their business activities. Carrefour authorizes KPMG to 
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control its activities, while Tesco monitors its activities by itself.xv Rewe points out that the 
partners of the company (EHA and the Öko-Institut) control the achievements of its 
commitments. Interestingly, not only Lidl, Aldi North and South, and Cosco do not publish 
any information about monitoring, but the Metro Group and Auchan fail to do so as well. 
Kroger mentions monitoring, but here, too, the information stops at that and is thus 
insufficient (Kroger 2009).  
 
In consequence, we find a similar level of variance in internal monitoring mechanisms for the 
programs investigated as we did for the other categories. The extent to which the world’s 
biggest food retailers have build in monitoring mechanisms in their programs ranges from 
ambitious plans to a complete neglect of the issues, with the majority of companies falling 
somewhere in between. Importantly, even those with monitoring provisions do not specify 
remedies in the case of failure.  
 
Group Programs 
 
When we turn to the group programs and check them against our four categories, we find that 
most programs, specifically the IFS and GFSI, however, appear to neglect the issue of climate 
change completely. They neither publish information on any kind of climate policy nor 
address the issue in their standards and principles. The GlobalGAP mentions on its homepage 
that its “standard is primarily designed to reassure consumers about how food is produced on 
the farm by minimising detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations [and] 
reducing the use of chemical inputs” (GlobalGAP 2009), but it is a challenge to find further 
information relating to environmental standards, and especially with respect to greenhouse 
gases. Therefore, we concentrate on the BRC and the ERRT.  
  
 
31 
 
 
If we look at the design (A) we can say that the BRC and the ERRT seem to be relatively 
active in addressing the issue of climate change. The BRC has defined five overarching 
environmental goals, which are divided into several smaller targets and each includes climate 
related aspects. For example, the first goal is to reduce the direct environmental impact of its 
organized retailers. As part of this goal, the BRC aims to reduce the emissions from its 
members’ buildings by 15 percent from 2005 levels by 2013, and energy-related transport 
CO2 emissions from store deliveries by 15 percent in the same period. The other goals 
comprise questions of the integration of suppliers or the change of the behavior of customers. 
The ERRT initiated a pledge in 2008 to reduce its environmental impact by 20% by 2020.xvi It 
prescribes a focus on energy efficiency where the ERRT, like the BRT, formulates five goals. 
First, members commit to reducing energy consumption per square meter of commercial 
premises by a minimum of 20% by 2020 compared to base year reference levels. Second, they 
want to work towards a more ambitious target than the European Commission’s target of 
sourcing 20% renewable energy by 2020. Third, they identify and share examples of best 
practice in delivering energy efficient solutions in the retail supply chain. Fourth, they attempt 
to investigate further ways of providing energy efficiency information for products they sell. 
Lastly, they want to share knowledge about the most effective ways of communicating 
information on energy consumption and energy saving behavior to consumers.  
 
In terms of partners and standards (B), the BRC reports that it aims to engage partnerships to 
reduce the environmental impact of its members. The ERRT does not provide any 
information in this category.  
 
Efforts to foster transparency and reporting (C) about the programs of the two associations 
can be identified, however. Relevant information can be downloaded from their respective 
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websites, on which both of them provide press releases and brochures about their 
environmental commitments. To monitor (D) the goals, the ERRT states that “the companies 
will report on progress through their annual reporting processes – for example, in their CSR 
reports, or specific energy efficiency reporting procedures, as appropriate” (ERRT 2008). In 
other words, EERT reporting does not go beyond the reporting by the individual companies. 
The BRT asks its members to report their performance on their environmental goals relative 
to the 2005 baselines, as well as their plans for future action.  
 
In terms of group programs, then, we can identify a couple of private voluntary programs 
addressing the issue of climate change by (food) retailers. These programs are in a very early 
stage, however, and lack ambition in terms of the inclusion of stakeholders and standards of 
comparability. The majority of associations and groups, however, are not active in this field. 
 
 
Critical Reflection and Assessment 
 
Having described the programs of the various retailers and groups, a critical reflection and 
explanatory assessment of the given climate change related activities and their likely 
effectiveness is necessary. Different aspects of input – in the form of designing and joining – 
and output – in the form of monitoring and complying – are covered. The comparative 
assessment shows that some food retailers, e.g. Walmart, Tesco and Carrefour, are relatively 
active in the climate change area, and their programs reflect some effort to reduce their carbon 
footprint. These actors have defined specific targets, work with civil society organizations, 
think-tanks or public actors in this context, and make their performance on the reduction of 
their carbon footprint relatively public and transparent. In addition, the BRC and the ERRT as 
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associations have comparatively clear climate targets and provide information about their 
commitments to climate change. In contrast, the activities and the information published by 
German or US food retailers, e.g. Lidl, Aldi and Cosco, or the GlobalGAP, are comparatively 
weak. Unsurprisingly, there is also a manifest lack of transparency. These activities engender 
little confidence in a reduction of the company’s or group’s carbon footprint. Finally, there 
are retailers and groups that do not have a program on climate change aspects at all, e.g. Aldi 
North, the GFSI and the IFS. 
 
In general, the question of the accessibility of climate policy information from the respective 
retail corporations needs to be critically evaluated. With the exception of Lidl, Aldi and 
Cosco, every retail chain considered here publishes an annual sustainability report.xvii 
Noticeably, Carrefourxviii, Tesco, Walmart and the Metro Group are the only retailers, which 
provide the previous sustainability reports on their homepage, thereby making available a 
means to compare the reports and assess progress. Auchan and Kroger only supply the most 
current version online. This makes it difficult to assess developments in the environmental 
performance of the company as well as its degree of goal achievement with respect to 
sustainability. If only the food corporations themselves compare their performance of the last 
year with previous years’ reports, one relies on the information provided. In other words, 
there is a lack of information accessibility and transparency. 
 
To avoid these problems, Walmart has been publishing a progress report since 2008, in which 
it compares its green house gas emissions from year to year. Interestingly, the emissions of 
Walmart and Tesco increased in the last year and both of the retailers publish this 
development in their reports. This seems to be a positive sign for the transparency of 
information, albeit a negative one for their carbon footprint and the achievement of their goal 
to reduce CO2. In contrast, the only information which can be found about the (weak) climate 
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policy of Lidl, Aldi and Cosco is on their homepage – and in all cases, it is difficult to define 
a date, or when commitments were made, as the retailers do not mention precisely when they 
started to commit to the environment.  
 
In terms of targets, Tesco, Carrefour, and the Metro Group have defined similar quantitative 
targets for reductions in GHG emissions. Walmart’s “Sustainability 360” approach seems 
very ambitious, but given its increasing CO2-emissions, they have yet to prove their ability to 
achieve this goal. Kroger has announced that it has already reduced its energy consumption 
by about 22% and that they will achieve a 30% percent reduction by 2010. In comparison to 
the other retailers, a large part of this reduction appears to have been achieved early and 
quickly. Here, further inquiries are needed to investigate the conditions, which have allowed 
Kroger to make such a progress in carbon emissions. The targets defined by Auchan, Aldi 
South, Rewe, and Lidl are much less specific or apply to very specific sections of their carbon 
footprint, such as their electricity supply. As collective entities, the BRC and ERRT have 
defined quantitative targets as well. These targets apply to all members of the group jointly, 
so that they allow for over- and underperformers. In other words, the responsibility and 
accountability of the individual company for the given target is limited.  
 
Most of the programs appearing to represent somewhat serious attempts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions on the part of a company or group are associated with investments in 
technologies and technological development, management and logistics as well as personnel. 
Tesco, in particular, has explicitly invested a large sum in a sustainable technologies fund. In 
general, however, little detail on the financial implications and requirements of the programs 
can be found. 
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Many retailers cooperate with key actors in their institutional environment from civil society 
or the public realm in their efforts, thus adding legitimacy to their activities. This is not the 
case, of course, to the extent that such partners have the respective company as their sole 
customer, i.e. are entirely dependent on that company. Such a case exists with respect to the 
actor helping Rewe stores to source 100 percent of their electricity supply from renewable 
sources. In addition, the cooperation with soft and broad initiatives like the Global Compact 
or the application of ISO 14000 standards promise little gain and therefore cannot be counted 
as contributing to the legitimacy and acclaim of a company’s efforts. Finally, the cooperation 
with government can be evaluated quite critically, from a different perspective. Thus, the 
BRC’s plans to inform the government on its climate related activities, to work with national 
and international policy makers towards the establishment of a low carbon economy, and its 
support for global emission targets could in the worst case just reflect intensive lobbying 
activities, and possibly aim at lowering targets or prolonging time frames envisioned by 
governments. Without further evidence on the actual content of the BRC’s communication 
with and support of governments such activities should not been seen as sources of legitimacy 
either. 
 
As discussed in the chapter by Hsueh and Prakash, information giving is crucial and. in our 
case, the investment of a number of retailers in carbon product labeling efforts is an 
interesting one for two reasons. First, such a measure would appear to allow a comprehensive 
and transparent approach to targeting greenhouse gas emissions associated with its products 
from farm to shelf. Such a measure transfers responsibility to the consumer, of course, which 
has both positive and negative sides. Second, the pattern in which the retailers considered here 
adopt this approach or invest in its development appears a bit erratic. Tesco is quite advanced 
in this regard and has been publicly promoting them for a while now. Auchan, which 
generally does not appear to have a very ambitious climate related program, is active in the 
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area of carbon product labeling as well. Rewe has joined a partnership on the development of 
carbon product labeling with other food companies and think tanks. It is only involved with 
one product (strawberries) here, however, so that it still has to prove a real interest in such an 
approach. Interestingly, Carrefour has adopted a different approach. Instead of the carbon 
label, it uses the life-cycle approach so that a critical reflection of the two types of labeling is 
needed (The Carrefour Group 2008). Through the life-cycle assessment, Carrefour attempts to 
evaluate the environmental impacts of its products during the process of production, use and 
disposal. This label includes, for example raw materials, such as oil or, in part, the emitted 
GHG. The carbon-labeling, however, which Tesco and Auchan have implemented, indicates 
how much CO2 is emitted from production to disposal. Tesco uses the standards of the 
Carbon Trust. The carbon-labeling is also a life cycle analysis, of course, but it does not 
measure the total environmental impact of aspects other that the GHG emissions (Schmidt 
2009). On the one hand, then, the carbon labeling can be criticized in that it just evaluates the 
GHG emissions instead of all of the overall resource use associated with the production cycle 
of a product. On the other hand, however, it can be argued that GHG emissions are the main 
cause of climate change, which may be the most pressing problem we are facing, and that 
therefore it makes sense to create a label that prioritizes them.  
 
However, in both cases the question whether the two types of assessment can reduce the 
emissions of GHG still needs to be answered. The impact of the two labels has been widely 
criticized and declared to be inadequate (Schmidt 2009). In particular, the reduction of 
environmental impact through the life cycle analysis or the carbon label needs an adequately 
trained and informed consumer, as well as the provision of alternative consumption choices. 
Moreover, the calculations always are based on certain assumptions. The assessment of a 
carbon label for a can, for instance, is only applicable if consumers recycle the can. The two 
labels often calculate the greenhouse gas balance of recycled products. In addition, the 
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calculation ends at the shelf, meaning that the distance, which consumers drive to get a 
product, is not included in the label. Therefore, we can see that the labeling is still in the 
process of becoming an instrument to reduce the GHG emissions associated with food 
production and consumption, only.  
 
On the basis of this comparison, then, there appear to be four rough categories of private 
programs of retailers and groups with respect to climate change issues. In the first group, 
retailers such as Walmart, Tesco and Carrefour would find their place. They have ambitious 
goals, try many ways to reduce their environmental impact, and give good access to their 
information and their climate policy achievements. The members of the second group also 
make information available, but not as detailed as the ones in the first group. Their activities 
and their commitments are weaker in comparison to the other retailers. Members of this group 
would include: Rewe, the Metro Group, Kroger, Auchan and the BRC (because of the lack of 
information and progress). The members of the third group do not make any clear 
commitments to climate change activities and do not regularly publish reports or make other 
detailed information about their climate activities available. Aldi South, Lidl (The Schwarz 
Group), Cosco and the ERRT would fall into this group. Finally, the members of the last and 
fourth group are the ones that neglect the issue of climate change altogether: Aldi North, the 
GlobalGAP, IFS, and GFSI.  
 
How do coverage and expected effectiveness of private retail food programs with respect to 
climate change match with the determinants of investments in private voluntary programs 
discussed in the theoretical framework laid out earlier in this chapter? In the following, we 
present some arguments on the impact of the determinants in this particular case. The 
discussion is far from comprehensive and very explicitly does not aim to provide a stringent 
testing of hypotheses. For such an endeavor, the empirical data are not sufficiently reliable 
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yet. Rather, we only point out preliminary ideas on the importance of some factors versus 
others because the programs reviewed are in many cases only in an infancy stage.   
 
The factor visibility does appear to play a role, but not a determinative one. All of the retailers 
considered are large. Yet, some of them do not even address their climate change impact in 
their private voluntary programs. Still, the larger retailers on average are the more active ones. 
Their programs address the issue of climate change, even though the question of effectiveness 
cannot be answered with confidence even for a large share of their activities. Additional 
explanations of the variance in the group derive from individual characteristics of the 
companies, which also influence their visibility. Walmart, for example has been plagued by 
scandals and is in need of improving its image.  
 
The characteristics of the home countries also appear to play a role. Tesco has its home base 
in the UK, i.e. a country in which a lot of awareness and pressure on retailers with respect to 
their environmental and social performance exists. Likewise, the French chains Carrefour and 
Auchan are likely to be affected by the dialogue between retailers and the government, 
mentioned above. In stark contrast, the German retailers appear to experience the least 
pressure. In fact, the public perception of food discounters in Germany focuses almost 
entirely on questions of price and induces hardly any discussion on their environmental 
performance.xix Even Lidl, which has experienced a number of labor scandals, apparently 
does not feel the need to really invest in private voluntary programs and redefine itself 
accordingly. Similarly, the characteristics of the host country appear to have an effect, as the 
German discounters, for instance, promote the little environmental efforts that they make only 
on their German homepages but not on the Austrian or Eastern European ones. 
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Finally, the involvement of public or civil society actors appears to aid the coverage and 
effectiveness of private voluntary programs with respect to climate change, even though the 
impact varies with the nature of the “partner”. Neither partners depending solely on the 
partnering company for their existence (e.g. the case of Rewe’s partnership with the Energie-
Handels-Gesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG – a German energy provider), nor large networks 
with a lack of individual leadership and focus such as the Global Compact appear to be 
providers of a significant impetus. However, it is remarkable that the corporations cooperating 
with a public partner, specifically Carrefour, Walmart and Tesco, are comparably strong in 
their commitments. Here further research will be needed to investigate the influence of public 
institutions on the voluntary programs and standards of TNCs.  
 
Additional and in the context of our topic particularly interesting influences appear to be 
provided by the characteristics of the problem ”climate change”. Thus, it is noteworthy that 
the actors and groups, which address climate change issues in their private voluntary 
programs the most, are those who have also other products in their assortment than food. In 
other words, they may be experiencing public pressure because the public sees a link between 
these other products and energy consumption issues. The link between food production and 
consumption and climate change, in contrast, does not yet appear to be well established in the 
public debate.  
 
This aspect is connected to the question of the costs involved in addressing a given problem. 
Not surprisingly, the majority of efforts delineated in the description of the private voluntary 
programs above focuses on questions such as energy use in buildings, transport and travel. In 
the context of agrifood, these issues would appear to be the “easy” ones. Improvements in 
lighting or the efficiency of the truck fleet can easily be made with existing and affordable 
technologies. Even more extreme, the supply of customers with products needed to deal with 
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changed weather conditions or providing information on one’s private voluntary programs to 
the political realm offer opportunities for business profit and image campaigns rather than 
representing costs. In contrast, reducing overall transport needs is a tougher task in an 
agrifood system that is based on global sourcing and distribution chains. Reducing the climate 
contribution of food as such, for instance by reducing the share of meat sold/consumed, an 
even tougher one, in particular as such an effort will not be popular with consumers either. In 
this context, it is noteworthy that the cooperation between Tesco and the Carbon Trust in the 
development of product carbon footprinting does not include meat products. 
 
What can we say about the determinants of the group standards and their effectiveness? The 
ERRT and the BRC are groups of a medium size with a clear retail focus of their participants, 
thus providing for some degree homogeneity of interests, although clearly not perfect 
homogeneity. The interests of member firms, such as IKEA and Kingfisher, are quite likely to 
diverge on a number of issues. In comparison, the GlobalGAP, IFS, and GFSI would seem 
narrower in their common focus, given that these are explicitly food related programs. One 
may argue that these initiatives involve actors other than retailers, of course, thus broadening 
the diversity of interests again. Yet, critical analyses of the initiatives have shown them to be 
strongly dominated by retail interests, especially in the stage of their creation.  
 
Given the existing, although limited heterogeneity of participating members in the BRC and 
ERRT, our theoretical considerations would lead us to expect a standard in the mid-range 
allowing over and under performances. This situation is indeed reflected in the lack of 
sanctioning and enforcement provisions of the two private voluntary programs and their 
provisions with respect to climate change, as well as the definition of rather broad objectives 
for the groups as such, rather than specific ones for the individual members. 
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Again, it is noteworthy that the private voluntary group programs focusing explicitly on food 
are those, who are the least active with respect to climate change. This appears to be another 
indication that the link between food production and consumption and climate change is not 
well established in the public debate and consumer awareness yet. It remains to be seen, 
whether this situation will change with the increasing focus on the agrifood contribution to 
greenhouse gas emissions, which we are currently witnessing. In other words, our expectation 
that a higher degree of homogeneity of the group and therefore less collective action problems 
would induce a private voluntary program, in which the standards are more narrowly defined, 
has to be expanded to include the interests of the given group members. If the dominant 
preference of the group members is not to invest in a respective program, than the greater 
homogeneity of the group will only make a weaker output more likely.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the climate change related commitments and activities by major 
retailers or relevant groups and their private voluntary programs are diverse. They range from 
ambitious quantitative targets to a complete neglect of climate change issues. Importantly, 
only a few programs mention compliance and monitoring processes in terms of their own 
rules. Because of the lacking control mechanisms, then, even the schemes promising to be 
ambitious are not able to engender sufficient trust that a ‘real’ change towards a reduction in 
greenhouse gases will materialize.  
 
How do these findings relate to the program performance, which the theoretical framework 
laid out in this chapter would have us expect? Visibility appears to be a factor, as the biggest 
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retailers are also particularly active. It is clearly not a determinative one, however, as those 
retailers not engaging in private voluntary programs related to climate change are far from 
small. The home country effect appears to be quite powerful, as does the influence of 
(serious) partners. Overall, then, a range of factors appear to induce retail corporations to 
invest in private voluntary programs relating to climate change. However, they do so to 
varying degrees and, for the majority of retail corporations, to a limited extent only. 
Particularly relevant, moreover, appear to be the problem characteristics and their influence 
on the costs of potential remedies. In the case of climate change, these problem characteristics 
mean that measures targeting the major sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the agrifood 
sector are extremely costly.  
 
From the perspective of the framework, then, we are facing a situation in which relatively 
steep cost curves are combined with benefit curves, which for many retailers appear to be set 
at relatively low levels. The conclusions which we can draw from this analysis, then, are two-
fold. We can identify a potential contribution of private voluntary programs in the retail sector 
to the pursuit of climate change objectives, in general. We also have to acknowledge, 
however, that this contribution is very limited right now and unlikely to expand dramatically 
in the future, unless conditions change substantially. 
 
To be more specific, private voluntary programs can contribute in certain ways and to a 
certain extent to climate change governance in the agrifood system. With sufficiently 
specified targets, a sufficient degree of transparency and monitoring as well as the 
specification of sanctioning mechanisms, private voluntary programs can probably contribute 
to increasing the energy efficiency of buildings, storage, and transport, for example. In other 
words, such programs can foster the diffusion of available and affordable technologies, as 
well as corresponding organizational and logistical measures. In order to foster the adequate 
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design of private voluntary programs across the board, however, an appropriate public 
framework would probably be needed. 
 
Moreover, the link between food production and consumption and climate change needs to be 
better established in the public debate. In consequence, the investigation and highlighting of 
this link should probably be a prime target for political and scholarly intervention in order to 
foster climate change governance in the agrifood system. With increasing public awareness of 
the large impact of food production and consumption, consumers and citizens would be able 
to exert more pressure on food retail corporations to pursue serious efforts in this respect. 
Similarly, public actors may consider establishing a firmer link between food policy, 
consumer policy and climate policy. Currently, these policy types frequently are handled in 
different ministries or by different public agencies. A better integration would not only allow 
for a more systematic targeting of the GHG emissions associated with food production and 
consumption by public governance, which in itself is an urgent necessity. It would also raise 
awareness on this link by consumers as well as business actors connected to the food chain.  
 
Yet, private voluntary programs should not be expected to address and solve such 
fundamental problems as the rise in GHG emissions caused by the increasing role meat plays 
in the diets of Western consumers as well as wealthy consumers in developing countries, for 
instance. Even the extent to which private voluntary programs will be able to really reduce 
food miles in a global agrifood system based on global sourcing and distribution structures is 
questionable. For necessary fundamental structural changes, public actors will have to take 
the responsibility themselves. This is particularly the case, as consumers face enormous 
information and collective action problems, of course, when attempting to change the carbon 
footprint of the global agrifood system from the consumption side. 
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If the necessary structural changes in the global agrifood system are in fundamental 
opposition to the interests of today’s powerful retail corporations, one may argue that looking 
at their private voluntary programs to assess such activities in the food sector is the wrong 
place to look, of course. Maybe we should look at the activities by other actors in the 
production and value chain instead. Indeed, individual food processors such as Nestle and 
Kraft have made commitments towards climate change. Similarly, individual pig farms in 
Germany are experimenting with combining pig raising with biogas production. The power of 
retail corporations and the private voluntary programs installed by them are one of the few 
available systems for a systematic implementation of climate change activities in the global 
food system so far, however. 
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Table 1: The Market Power of TNCs in the Agricultural Sector  
Product 
Share in global exports 
markets  by 3-6 of the 
largest TNCs in 
agricultural sector 
wheat 80-90% 
corn 85-90% 
sugar 60% 
coffee 85-90% 
rice 70% 
cocoa 85% 
tea 80% 
bananas 70-75% 
wood 90% 
cotton 85-90% 
pelts, furs and skins 25% 
tobacco 85-90% 
caoutchouc 70-75% 
jute and jute products 85-90% 
Source: Enquete-Commission Globalization of the World 
Economy, Deutscher Bundestag, 2002. 
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 Designing Targets (A) Partners and Standards (B) 
 
Issue of 
climate 
change 
TTargets 
Rene-
wable 
Energy 
Supplier Partner-
ships 
Standard
s 
Walmart ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ 
Tesco + + ++ + ++ ++ 
Carre-
four ++ ++ - + ++ + 
Metro + + + - + -/+ 
Kroger + ++ - -/+ - - 
Rewe + + ++ - + + 
Auchan + - + - + -/+ 
Aldi 
South + - + - - - 
Lidl -/+ - -/+ - -/+ - 
Cosco +/- - - - - -/+ 
Aldi 
North - - - - - - 
 
 
Transparency and Reporting (C) Monitoring (D) 
 Infor-
mation Reports Label Monitoring 
Walmart ++ ++ - ++ 
Tesco ++ + ++ + 
Carre-
four ++ + + + 
Metro -/+ + - - 
Kroger -/+ + - -/+ 
Rewe ++ + -/+ -/+ 
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Auchan + + + - 
Aldi 
South -/+ - - - 
Lidl -/+ - - - 
Cosco - - - - 
Aldi 
North - - - - 
 
Explanation of the signs: - = the criterion has not been met, - / + =the criterion has been partly 
met, + = the criterion has been met, + + = the criterion has been more than met 
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Notes  
 
i
 These numbers include the so called CO2 equivalents. These equivalents describe the 
consequences of other gases, which are by far more dangerous for the atmosphere than CO2 
like Methan or Nitric oxide, for the climate change. They are calculated in relation to CO2. 
Without the calculation of the CO2 equivalents the climate change impact of the agrifood 
sector would be less than 20% (Greenpeace 2008).  
 
ii
 Private voluntary programs falling into the interaction between the agrifood system and 
climate change in the broadest sense, are self-regulatory schemes in the field of bio-fuel 
production. However, these programs represent a special case and do not reflect the broader 
dynamics of this interaction. Accordingly, they will not be considered here. 
 
iii
 Depending on the exact interpretation, the term “voluntary” may be misleading, at least in 
some cases (see below). 
 
iv
 As the costs of implementation and documentation (including auditing and certification) 
tend to be extremely high from the perspective of small farmers in developing countries, 
private retail food standards have received a lot of criticism for pushing these farmers out of 
the market and into subsistence farming. 
 
v
 The list of factors also shows that socio-institutional path dependencies will exert an 
influence. 
 
vi
 With increasing concerns about the capture of civil society actors, their legitimacy claims 
may also be challenged, of course. 
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vii
 Such calculations must be seen in a mid- to long-term perspective, of course, because some 
investments are only likely to pay off after a while. This will most certainly be the case for the 
actual achievement of climate change objectives. Benefits drawn from a better image of a 
retail corporation or the retail sector as such may well accrue in the short run, already. 
 
viii
 Technical support for company B by company A is possible in this context as well. 
 
ix
 Aldi is split into Aldi North and Aldi South, which have split territories between them both 
in Germany and internationally. Aldi North operates in Belgium, Denmark, in the North of 
Germany, in France, Luxemburg, Portugal, Poland and Spain. In contrast, Aldi South is 
operating in Australia, Austria, in the South of Germany, in Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and in the US.  
 
x
 In this chapter, we consider the commitments of Lidl, as the biggest food retailer of the 
Schwarz Group.  
 
xi
 Although, Kroger operates in the USA only and is not a transnational supermarket chain, we 
mention it here because of its economic power and number of existing stores. It is assumed 
that the environmental impact of Kroger is comparable with the other retail food corporations. 
xii
 The authors are aware that some of these international standards cannot ensure program 
stringency, as they entail weak control or sanctioning mechanisms, as discussed in the other 
chapters of this book. However, this criterion was chosen as such standards allow a first step 
towards a comparison and benchmarking of programs.  
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xiii
 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol was established by the World Resource Institute and the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development and aims to install the development 
and promotion of internationally accepted accounting and reporting systems for greenhouse 
gases (http://www.ghgprotocol.org/ ). 
 
xiv
 Through the carbon labeling it is possible to evaluate how much CO2 and its equivalents is 
emitted during the production, transportation, use and waste process of selected products 
(Tesco 2009). Consumers are informed about the GHG which were produced when they buy 
carbon labeled products, so that they can play an active role in decreasing emissions (Tesco 
2009). 
 
xvIt could be criticized that Tesco monitors its activities in this meaning. The fact that Tesco 
indicates that it has emitted more CO2 in 2009 than in 2008 is a hint that the monitoring 
process is independent.  
 
xvi
 The relevant members, who participated in this commitment, are: Asda (Walmart in the 
UK), the Carrefour Group, the Metro Group and Tesco. 
 
xvii
 The Metro Group published a climate brochure, which, however, provides much less 
information than the other reports.  
 
xviii
 It is also possible to order all the reports (except for the most recent one). 
 
xix
 A frequently voiced view is that the discounters provide cheap, quality products. Quality, 
however, does not refer to environmental or social characteristics in this context. 
